Articles Posted in Mergers & Acquisitions

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The pace of merger and acquisition activity in Silicon Valley continues unabated, and the satisfaction of conditions to make sure both parties conclude a deal with all loose ends tied up becomes critical to a final closing. In my last blog, I discussed certain standard closing conditions contained in merger and acquisition documentation, particularly the requirement of stockholder approval and the use and impact of dissenters’ rights. In this blog, I will cover some of the other commonly used conditions in acquisitions of privately held companies.

Being a technology transfer lawyer, many of my clients’ deals focus on the need to retain key employees after the company is sold. For that reason, a key closing condition included in most acquisition agreements requires that certain employees with the acquired company agree to continue working with the company for a period of time after the closing. Often this obligation is structured by requiring the employees to sign employment agreements or consulting agreements with the buyer. Managing this process can be tricky, because employees will want to agree to terms they find preferable (e.g., receiving additional options and higher salary) and some key employees may be reticent to work with a buyer they do not know. In addition, negotiations occur between the key employee and an acquirer before a deal is closed, which is sometimes an awkward process.

Covenants Not to Compete

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Whether an acquisition is in San Jose, Cupertino, San Francisco, or anywhere else in California or the United States, any corporate lawyer will tell you that a buyer will not close a deal unless certain conditions are satisfied. Fortunately, closing conditions contained in mergers and acquisitions documentation have become standardized. Exceptions, however, always arise based on the unique attributes of the transaction, and standard does not always mean simple.

Some merger or acquisition closing conditions are standard and rarely require negotiation. For example, one of the standard closing conditions is that there is no injunction, law, or court order that prevents the transaction from proceeding. Outside of an actual known threat to a transaction, these clauses are rarely negotiated in a private company acquisition transaction.

Another standard closing condition is that the requisite corporate approvals will be secured. Because the respective Board of Directors of the each company will have approved the acquisition agreement, this is usually a noncontroversial item.

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As a Silicon Valley corporate attorney who often represents the selling company in mergers and acquisitions, I know that a huge amount of effort goes into signing an acquisition agreement. As I have discussed in past blogs, issues from earnouts to preparing exceptions schedules will have turned into countless hours of negotiations, documentation, and late night telephone calls for both the seller and the acquiring company and their corporate lawyers. In the end, the agreement is signed and everyone gets some well-needed sleep, only to wake up to the final sprint to closing.

In this blog, I will discuss what happens when a deal does not close simultaneously with the signing of the acquisition agreement. Similar to a contract for buying a house, many merger and acquisition deals require the buyer and seller to sign an agreement, and then perform additional items before the final closing.

At the same time as the deal team pours over the necessary closing tasks, there is still a business to run. Even though the seller remains in control of the business, the buyer wants to make sure it eventually acquires a company that is in good working order. For this reason, commitments are designed to guide business operations pending the closing.

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Although most of my career as a merger and acquisition and corporate lawyer has been spent in San Jose, issues involving earnouts do not have geographic boundaries. While many companies are acquired for their team or their technology, other companies are acquired because they make money for their stockholders. Earnouts provide an opportunity for a buyer to be assured that the company it has just bought will meet its objectives for the deal.

To construct an earnout that measures a company’s success in making money, a tension arises between allowing the selling company to operate on its own, thereby mimicking its performance as it existed before it was sold, and integrating the seller’s operations with the buyer. Buyers will want to integrate the seller as quickly as possible, but doing so will prevent the parties from determining how well the seller itself is performing.

The most important issue to determine is how profits will be calculated. As discussed in a previous blog, issues involving the use of GAAP become much more important as more revenue and expense items are measured. A detailed approach to calculating profits will help reduce disputes and provide guidance for the seller’s managers to use in maximizing the earnout.

Earnouts constructed to measure profits typically require the seller to operate as a separate division, or even a separate entity. To take advantage of synergies, some operations are centralized with the buyer, such as finance and administration. The first area of dispute involves the manner in which administrative overhead, and the type of overhead, will be charged against the earnout. Outside of textbook ratios, there is no magic number and the result is usually reached through negotiation.

Often sales forces are consolidated, and the allocation of sales-related expenses and commissions can be very difficult, especially when the buyer’s existing sales department is leveraged to produce sales for the seller. As with overhead, there are no easy answers and the approaches ultimately used are reached through negotiation.

Because of their complexity, earnout amounts are often disputed. Because of this, care must be taken to create an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism. Regardless of the dispute resolution process used for the acquisition agreement as a whole, arbitrating any earnout disputes has a number of advantages. First, the arbiter, or arbiters, can be specified as having expertise in accounting issues, or even in calculating earnouts. Relevant industry experience can be listed as a necessary attribute. Second, the arbitration can focus solely on determining the arbitration amount. Third, the parties can be required to go through nonbinding mediation. If successful, mediation can avoid the expense of an arbitration proceeding. Fourth, the proceedings can be kept confidential.

Earnouts, especially those based on profits, can be very complex and prone to dispute. Because of this, care must be taken by all parties to create a mechanism that will adequately measure performance while minimizing the opportunity for controversy.

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Whether you are negotiating an acquisition in Silicon Valley or Small Town, USA, a part of the purchase price is often deferred. I have discussed in prior blogs those portions of the purchase price that are held back to reduce the buyer’s risk of liabilities and issues with post-closing audits. In future blogs, I will discuss a common purchase price deferral that will pay the seller based on the performance of the business AFTER it is sold, often called a contingent purchase price, or an “earnout.”

An earnout serves two purposes. First, it can bridge a valuation gap that may exist between the buyer and the seller. In a sense, the buyer is saying “If your business is worth that much, prove it.” Second, the buyer uses an earnout to protect against risks arising out of everything from insufficient due diligence to difficulty in integrating operations, that the ultimate value will be less than the purchase price.

There are a number of advisors, in addition to a merger and acquisition attorney, that are critical to creating an accurate earnout. First among equals is a CPA. An experienced CPA should be brought in early and often to provide advice concerning the general nature of generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”), where interpretations can vary, and how the parties have recognized revenue and expense items and the extent to which they differ. The second is both the buyer’s and seller’s accounting departments. Managing an earnout requires specific knowledge of the accounting functions of the parties involved, and many disputes can be avoided by understanding each party’s processes and how they are to be managed through the earnout period.

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As a merger and acquisition lawyer in Silicon Valley, I have been involved in numerous business transactions, from small startups transferring their technologies after getting acquired by other companies, to medium-sized and larger technology and pharmaceutical companies going public. With Facebook’s impending IPO, many companies in San Jose, Sunnyvale, Santa Clara and Mountain View are expecting another technology boom. A company hoping to take advantage of the imminent dot-com boom and sell its business should make sure its books are in order and hire a good M&A attorney to prepare an acquisition agreement.

As discussed in my last blog, a seller will often make a number of commitments to a buyer concerning the seller’s business. These commitments, known as representations and warranties, allocate between the buyer and seller many of the risks existing in the seller’s business.

One of the most important documents accompanying the representations and warranties is a schedule that describes certain items requested to be disclosed, and any exceptions to the content of the representations and warranties. This document, which goes by “Schedule of Exceptions” or “Disclosure Schedule,” is really a description of the main documents and key agreements of the seller, and disclosures of material facts concerning the buyer and its operations. It can often take as much time to prepare and negotiate as the acquisition agreement itself. There are a number of things the seller can do to help expedite the preparation of this document.

First, keep good corporate records. As I discussed in my blog on due diligence, organizing the seller’s major documents, and making sure they are readily available, will considerably reduce the time to close the transaction.

Second, appoint someone who has intimate knowledge of the seller and its operations to assist in gathering requested documentation and answer the inevitable questions. Typically, the company’s chief financial officer or controller will fill this role.

Third, get all of the documents to the company’s attorney as soon as possible. The lawyers will need to review the documents and decide what types of schedules and disclosures will be required. This is a very time consuming process.

Fourth, discuss early on any areas where the company thinks a buyer might be concerned. This is not a time to sweep difficult issues under the rug, but a time to get them out in the open. There is nothing worse than being blind-sided at the last minute with the proverbial skeleton in the closet. Worse, failing to disclose difficult issues known to management can lead to a fraud claim, a claim for which the seller’s liability is never limited. Areas that raise concerns include any transactions between the seller and any of its insiders, litigation and threats of litigation, and accounting irregularities.

Fifth, start preparing the Disclosure Schedule as soon as possible. Attorneys that are experienced in acquisition transactions are aware of the likely representations that will be requested, and can start organizing and preparing the substance of the Disclosure Schedule even before the acquisition agreement is distributed. Delivering a completed Disclosure Schedule to buyer’s counsel sooner rather than later will surface any issues so they can be resolved in a timely manner.

Sixth, review the Disclosure Schedule with your attorney to determine if any issues exist that will delay closing. There are two major areas that need to be reviewed. The first is the approval that is required for the transaction to proceed. Almost always, this will involve approval by the board of directors and the shareholders of the Company. It may require preparation and delivery of a separate disclosure document to the shareholders to assist them in determining whether to approve the transaction. The second is the existence of any material agreements, desired by the buyer to operate the business, that require approval of the other party in order to close the transaction.

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Those endless representations and warranties in your acquisition agreement aren’t just for your merger and acquisition lawyer. Ignore them at your own risk.

Mergers and acquisitions in San Jose and elsewhere are a lot more complex than those of the past when deals were closed with a handshake. As acquisition documentation becomes more extensive, companies frequently turn to mergers and acquisitions attorneys to assist them with their transactions. One issue on which an attorney will focus deals with the representations and warranties of a seller.

A seller’s representations and warranties, which are the commitments that a seller will make to a buyer concerning the state of the seller’s business, make up one of the more extensive sections of an acquisition agreement and serve a number of functions. This is because they allocate between the buyer and seller many of the risks existing in the buyer’s business.

Representations allocate risk in a fairly straightforward manner. The seller will make a statement of fact regarding its business. If the seller’s statement is wrong, and the buyer is damaged as a result, the seller will compensate the buyer for any damages the buyer incurs.

An example helps illustrate the point. Let’s say that the seller states that it has paid all of its taxes, a very common representation. After the closing, the business that was sold gets hit with a sales tax audit, and is found to have underpaid its sales taxes. Because the seller’s representation was wrong (i.e., it hadn’t paid all of its taxes), the buyer, all other things being equal, can look to the seller for reimbursement for the amount of the additional sales tax liability.

The situation above describes the simplest form of risk allocation in an acquisition agreement. In this form, the seller bears the risk whether the seller knew there was a problem or not.

Some types of risk allocation shift risk only if the seller knew there was a problem. These representations, sometimes referred to as knowledge-qualified representations, allow a seller to escape liability in a representation if the seller did not know a problem existed.

In our sales tax example above, let’s say that the representation stated that the seller did not know of any nonpayment of taxes. Let’s also say that the seller’s officers were completely unaware that they had failed to pay any sales taxes. In that situation, the seller would not be liable for the sales tax liability.

Because acquisition agreements are prepared by lawyers, the concept of knowledge can mean different things. For example, does knowledge mean the subjective knowledge of the seller’s CEO, or the subjective knowledge of all of the seller’s employees? Does knowledge mean just what is in employees’ memories, or should employees be required to look through their files? If employees are required to look through files, should they also be required to look through other documentation, such as public records and other resources? For these reasons, it is critical that the concept of knowledge be defined so that the seller knows what they have to do to satisfy the representation, and both parties know how the risk is to be allocated.

What if the seller wants to allocate the risk of an item back to the buyer? When a seller makes a representation that he or she knows may not be entirely correct, the seller will disclose an “exception.” The seller provides this disclosure in a schedule commonly attached to acquisition agreements, known as a “disclosure schedule,” or a “schedule of exceptions.” Unless the agreement specifies otherwise, a buyer cannot recover for damages for an item that has been disclosed.

Going back to our sales tax example, if the seller knew there was a problem, the seller would describe the problem in a disclosure schedule. The seller would say something like “Seller underpaid its sales tax liability for the periods 2008 through 2010, which liability seller believes to be between $50,000 and $75,000.” The buyer could not thereafter bring a claim for reimbursement for the later assessed tax liability as a result of the seller’s disclosed exception.

As I mentioned above, representations and warranties, and their accompanying disclosures, are heavily negotiated. One point of contention is whether the risk of an item, even when disclosed, should be allocated to the buyer. Buyers with sufficient leverage will force the seller to remove the disclosed item, or affirmatively accept the risk associated with the item. Another point of contention is what the concept of knowledge means, and whether knowledge can qualify a particular representation. For these reasons, it is critical to spend a lot of time understanding the representations and warranties of any acquisition agreement so that you can understand the risks that may exist for you in a deal.

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Most letters of intent describing acquisitions in Silicon Valley, as elsewhere, will describe the material points of a transaction. Although a properly drafted letter of intent will provide that the business points of the deal are nonbinding, it is difficult in the course of any negotiation to change a business point already agreed upon. As a result, take care to describe those points that are most important to a transaction and to leave others to be negotiated as part of the definitive agreement.

The most important point is obviously the purchase price. This can be expressed, among other ways, as an absolute amount. If the transaction is a merger, the absolute amount is converted into a conversion or exchange rate based on the market value of the acquirer’s stock over a period of time preceding the closing.

It is very unusual for the price to be paid all at once. Typically, the amount ultimately paid will be subject to post-closing adjustments based on issues unrelated to financial performance (often referred to as a holdback) as well as issues related to financial performance or other milestones (often referred to as an earnout). These provisions must be considered very carefully, as they are often a source of litigation. This blog will only discuss the holdback.

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In negotiating a recent acquisition for a client selling a business in Santa Cruz, we were presented with a letter of intent outlining the terms of the transaction. The letter was well-constructed, and contained the material aspects of the deal, all of which were nonbinding. There were, however, a number of terms that were expressly made binding.

There are four binding terms most commonly used in nonbinding letters of intent for acquisitions of privately held companies. The first is that the parties will agree to standard nondisclosure obligations. The second is that the acquirer will be allowed to conduct a diligence investigation of the target. The third is that each party will pay its own fees incurred in connection with the transaction. If the transaction is a stock transaction, there may be some negotiation over whether the target can pay fees, under the theory that a stock deal is a deal among stockholders, rather than the corporation.

The fourth is the most hotly negotiated term – the “no shop” or “exclusivity” provision. The no shop is just as it sounds: the target company agrees not to “shop” itself while the transaction is in process. Acquirers usually demand this term so that their offer is not used by the target to get a better deal, and so that the time and expense they spend in the due diligence and negotiation process is not thwarted by another suitor. An acquirer will also ask that the target company stop any discussions with any other potential acquirer, and notify the acquirer if the target company receives any other acquisition inquiries.

Target companies attempt to insert a number of qualifications and limitations to the no shop clause. First, the target will request a “fiduciary out”. In this exception, the no shop is ineffective where an unsolicited alternate offer must be accepted in order for the target’s board of directors to satisfy its fiduciary duties. Second, the target will attempt to impose strict time deadlines which, if not met, will cause the no shop to expire. The primary deadline will be on the parties entering into a definitive agreement. Other deadlines include the acquirer’s completion of its due diligence investigation, and the closing of the acquisition.

Other binding terms include break-up fees where one party, typically the acquirer, will pay the other party, typically the target, if the acquirer decides not to proceed with the transaction.

As with most deals, the extent of number and type of binding terms in a letter of intent depends on the relative bargaining strength of the parties.

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Any Silicon Valley mergers and acquisitions lawyer helping clients buy and sell high technology companies is invariably provided with a simple letter of intent, happily signed by a couple of companies without input from their tax and legal advisors, and asked to prepare binding documents. In one case, my San Jose business client was not too worried about the lack of detail in the letter because, after all, it was just a “letter of intent”. She was less than happy when I told her that she had actually signed a binding agreement, particularly since very little due diligence had been performed on the target company and a number of ‘minor’ issues that were important to her still required resolution.

A letter of intent (also called “LOI”, or memorandum of understanding, or “MOU”) is usually a short letter that outlines the basic business terms of a deal. Without language expressly stating that the letter is nonbinding, and that no obligations arise except under a definitive agreement, however, that letter you signed may be a legally binding contract. Even with this kind of language, a letter of intent can morph into a binding contract IF the parties conduct themselves as if the target company has been acquired. Announcing a deal (when not otherwise legally required), combining operations before a closing, and similar actions, can create a contract from conduct. With no definitive agreement signed, the letter of intent may be used as evidence to set the terms of the deal.

Why do you want an LOI to be nonbinding? Letters of intent are usually prepared and signed after the initial business proposition and marketing analysis have been performed. They are typically signed before the acquirer has a chance to really investigate the target. This is because neither party will want to conduct an expensive diligence investigation until each is sure they have a deal. If the letter of intent is binding, then the acquiring company may find itself purchasing a lot of problems of which it wasn’t aware when it signed the letter of intent.

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